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MORAL MOTIVE AND THE ETHICS OF JESUS

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MORAL MOTIVE AND THE ETHICS OF JESUS.

- CHAPTER I -

ANTI-REPRESSIONISM IN POPULAR THOUGHT.

.I.

Much of our modern literature and popular philosophy sets forth the cheaply won but apparently honest conviction that all sorts of self-repression are undesirable. The general tendency is perfectly obvious. Whether one is in touch with the life of the times from the side of law or religion, of education or parenthood, indications of a rampant philosophy of unlimited self-expression are sure to strike in upon him from many sources. Movements of "free this-or-that" are not by any means longer confined to Greenwich Village. The literary sources and resources of this anti-repressionism are appalling. Any well-stocked periodicial stand would furnish ample material. Newspapers, without explicitly declaring themselves advocates of this philosophy, give it implicit justification daily by exalting crime, scandal and moral piracy. The stage and the screen, though they often pretend to instil ideals of an opposite sort, actually display the undisciplined life in such pretty colors as to plant in those who watch a desire to taste its fruits. The spirit which pervades our schools and universities is perhaps on the whole more reactionary than radical in this regard; at any rate, there is probably little attempt to rationalize respectably the practice of non-repressive living. One finds, however,

little positive content on the side of control. The study of man in History, Anthropology, Biology and Psychology tends to scatter the attention and avert it from the central facts of character and personality. Add to this the current naturalistic approach to science and the well-known College "irreligious tradition," and the result is a mental leadership which is morally illiterate.

There is much cause to look upon the vogue of antirepressionism as a serious matter. The optimistic psychology which Bolingbroke voices thru Pope, took for granted that

> "Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
> As to be hated, needs but to be seen,"

but a newer and more empirical science of man teaches that many, (tho not all), of our human kind are largely the product of their surroundings, having little inner drive or tendency of a distinct and surmounting strength. This is true not only of body and mind, but applies equally in the case of conscience. We do not suffer a falling-off in our faith that there is "a light that lighteth every man," but we are forced to recognize that this light is more tenderly delicate in its beginnings than is either mind or body. Failure to instil a courageous and high-minded conscience in the individuals who make up a public, results in a lowered public standard. More serious yet is the outcome when there is a strong and extensive propaganda actually supporting and encouraging the lowered standard.

II

"Tell me your ambitions and I will tell you what sort of man you are." Ambition of some sort possesses most persons; the kinds of it may be of infinite variety. As one great and influential force in the molding of the public and private conscience therefore one should not overlook the popular appeals to ambition. What sort of ambitions are held aloft as appealing to men's aspirations? Glancing at certain of our leading periodicals, one would be led to affirm that, of all the desires of the American public, commercial prosperity is the most powerful. Fiction, biography, comment, and, (above all, for purposes of insight), advertisement, pass all sentries with the watchword "Success." Another group of magazines seem earnestly intent upon having all America bow down to the brawny giant who, beautified by tights and an appaling system of musculature, stands with arms akimbo and chest expanded,- all, bless you, by virtues of Prof. So-and So's "Diet and Daily Dozen."

If one catches the reader of modern literature off his guard, he is apt to find him engrossed in fiction. The type of this fiction is also a good index to the kind of influences which bear in on the public conscience and character. Occasionally, periodical fiction is good; often it serves as half-propaganda on behalf of established ideas; again, and increasingly, the magazine fiction of our time tends to the worthless or harmful. The cheapest of cheap print paper is that employed by the purveyors of "Nippy," "Dopey" and "True Stories." Such fiction

as one discovers here is frankly a pandering to the over-developed appetite for "sensation at any price." It is difficult for one to see how it is possible that such rot should outsell even the "Saturday Evening Post." Lastly, there is a group of publications whose frank glory it is to dispense the alluringly suggestive in the form of humor. "La Vie Parisienne," translated into its American counterpart, becomes filthy trash, "sans humor, sans art, sans everything." A writer in the "California Christian Advocate" says that "the sewer has broken in the magazine world, and the result is to be found littering up the streets where you and your children walk." Even allowing the discount due to the well-known Methodist zeal for morals, we cannot but approve his characterization of the bulk of popular periodical material as "News-stand poison," "livery-stable literature" and "twaddle for the moron mind." (1)

Tho the sentiments that are appealed to in so much of this literature are cheap, shady, and gross, is it fair, it might be asked, to judge the reading public by its worst points? Surely, the influences which prove popular are artifically promulgated, falsely and distortedly presented, because reading, like almost all the forms of popular entertainment, is commercialized. The sewer is open because publishers "publish for profit." The principal is one, however, which works both ways. The writer and publisher of literature are interested in success on their own

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(1) Paul Hutchinson, in the California Christian Advocate; "News-stand Poison." November 27, 1924.

part; they produce what it pays them best to produce. If the sale of smut or twaddle proved too small to be profitable, the tide of it would be ebbing rather than flowing. At any rate, tho the subject of the cause and effect of this phenonenon be settled to our own satisfaction, there still remains the fact. After all, the central thing in conduct is fact; conduct is influenced by things, by situations, persons and experiences. The sort of mutuality that exists between circumstance and conduct is such that one must first attack the circumstance.

But from the standpoint of this study, the decadent literature of the news-stand is only a single omen, a sympton which signalizes something lying deeper in the mind of society. If these crass panderings to a perverted taste were found alone in those underground channels which formerly enbanked "Diamond Dick" and "Hairbredth Harry," we might feel some assurance that the better popular taste was opposing it. But if the tendency extends into the entire field of amusement, in a day when amusements rank so high in statistics of spending, there is more cause for serious regard. If news standards are so utterly false, in a day when the newspaper molds public opinion and standards as it does, there is need for close consideration. And if there exists a "thotful" liberalism in morals, which exults in the breakdown of old restraints, it becomes necessary to look higher-up than ever for the fountainheads of moral degeneration.

III.

When one mentions "Morals," he expects of course to be understood as meaning primarily "sex morality." That sex plays

so large a part in the life of man and society is of course the explanation of the large part it plays in discussions and studies about practical conduct. It also permeates the content of the sort of literature we have been mentioning. "Morals" must however be understood in a much larger sense than the popular one. Morals exist wherever and whenever there is a semblance of reasonable debate about conduct of any sort, provided the alternatives involve judgments of higher and lower. It follows that the fundamental needs and interests of men will all carry a moral significance, or to be more exact, a cluster of such meanings. In this list of essential activities and interests, some under-rank sex, others stand on a par with it, while a great many exceed it in significance. Murders, maimings, thefts, slavery, poverty and incest are still "monsters of so frightful mien;" but those violations of social mutuality whose results are less openly apparent, -adulteries, economic oppression, extreme self-seeking, war, violation of law,-these find both their anonymous and their open champions. If sex holds a place on the front line of interest, it is because of a combination of circumstances which can be accepted here as inevitable.

The fact stands out that in a series of twelve articles on morals which appeared recently in a leading liberal periodical, ten had to do directly with the relation of the sexes. (1)

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(1) The Nation: "New Morals for Old"; May-November, 1924.

It is also a fact to be carefully scrutinized that one must read morally "conservative" journals like the "Christian Century" to find the really constructive radicalism of the day, which lies in the fields of industry, international relations and race.

IV.

It is not to be supposed that all the objections to traditional morality which find expression in thotful liberal journals are scurrilous and destructive. There is much that is high in tone, with an emphasis on heart-righteousness and an abhorrence of mere outer conformity. Mr. Edwin Muir, e.g., states that one ought "to accept men and women as ends in themselves," -a principle which Kant perceived with a different emphasis, and which when carried out in its true implications, carries with it many a just and necessary reform.(1) Again, Miss Charlotte Gilman gives a boost "Toward Monogamy" when she contends that the monogamic standard is biologically correct, and, -surprisingly, considering the general tenor of this series,- she insists that monogamy is for men as well as for women.(2)

We find on the other hand a certain extremism which proceeds out of that large social element who begin by exalting the violation of conventions as form, and end by advocating a

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(1) The Nation: "Women, Free for What?" August 6, 1924.

(2) The Nation: June 11, 1924.

certain content of non-conformity. As a matter of fact there is considerable doubt as to the direction of the proceeding in such cases. But the characteristic of the "Greenwich Village" type of "reform" is always negative. It never seeks to draw the masses up to a higher, (i.e., always a more difficult) standard, but always seems to suppose that the social whole will be renovated by a process of letting-up, and the forgetting of those restraints which make social mutuality harder than self-regalement.

Practiced thinkers may see something both of truth and falsity in the statement that "sex morality imposed by repression and the power of custom creates artificial conceptions and will eventually break down." No one would deny that such morality and conceptions lose their vitality when divorced from the inner perception of their rightness. If one should approve the necessity of "women" (or anyone else) ....."demanding to live the forbidden experiences directly and draw conclusions on this basis; or "assuming the right to act as their own impulses dictate with much the same freedom that men have enjoyed for so long," then his reaction would probably not be adverse in the case of the statement that "there has arisen a feeling of moral rightness in the present conduct, and wrongness in the former morality."(1) When "women's rights" are made synonymous with so-called "rights of men", which no gentleman of the past three generations has approved or practiced with impunity from his

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(1) Beatrice M. Hinkle: The Nation; "Women and the New Morality". November 19, 1925.

conscience, then there enters an insistent suspicion that something, somewhere, is rotten.

Perhaps it would not be unfair to apply to such moral reasoning the evaluation of Mr. Lynn H. Harris.

> "It is possible," says Mr. Harris, "That some of these writers are honest, but that the light that is in them is darkness.....We all know that one of the chief uses to which we put our 'reason' is that of inventing justification for our actions or our opinions. This is one of the cases where 'a little knowledge is a dangerous thins.' The ordinary chap who does a meanness usually hears from his conscience, and keeps on hearing from it until he has at least made a gesture toward amendment. If he has a philosophy, however, instead of a conscience, he proceeds with a logical flourish to show, first that his action was not wrong at all; and second, that on the contrary his is the true morality. Having attained to this serene illumination, he proceeds with more or less pity to enlighten those who are still blinded by the judgment of the herd. In a case like this, it indeed hard to tell where sincerity leaves off and bias begins." (1)

It is remarkable how quickly and effectively this type of rationalization reacts upon the conduct of young men and women of the great American middle class. The well-known adolescent trait of desiring to be "shown" is a commendable one. Youths are as little inclined as ever to accept "thou shalt not's" on authority alone. Older persons are often too "modest" or too ignorant to furnish the background of fact required for making sound social judgments and adjustments. But the current-novel shelf does furnish a philosophy of conduct, and one which

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(1) The Christian Century: "Our Sex-Obsessed Literature." October 30, 1924.

appears attractive to the ripening powers of youth. Realism prevails; -realism meaning of course correspondence with the darker side of life. The complete reversal of accustomed standards of chastity more often than not leaves the unenlightened one with a bad taste in his mouth. Again, one is lost in astonishment at the low literary value of what passes so widely for literature. Above all, one is impressed by the obvious attempt of such authors to present a theory of ethics. If this sort of ethical fiction is "better" than another, it is because its abnormal characters fail to arouse the admiration which young people with normal instinct feel for things better. If these fiction men and women do arouse favor, it is because they invariably either possess or crave "individuality," a trait whose desirability is a set conviction of this school.

V.

It would be both shoddy reasoning and shabby sportsmanship to refuse to believe anything good about this extreme school of literary ethicists. The reader of such defenses of unrestrained individualism is faced with the conviction that a return must be made to a personal morality. Unfortunately, writers usually mean by "personal" such things as "purely individual," "uninfluenced by social conventions," or even "antisocial." They fail often to distinguish between the restraint which is the direct result of a long line of social experience, and a mere "tabu," the restriction unrecognizably coated over with artificialities. But the heart of liberal ethics is

touched with idealism. Mr. Krutch, is speaking of the problems and complications arising out of the frankness with which modern sex-novel writers view their subject, says,

> "When the conception of marriage is, as it has tended to be in modern times, legalistic, these problems are submerged. As long as marriage is a matter of contract, the importance of the inward harmony of personalities is of the slightest, for children may be begotten and reared whether the parents love or hate. As long as passion is generally conceded to be but a shameful concession to unregenerate humanity, the average man is not likely to be much concerned when he finds that the ideal of the poets is not realized in his own nuptial couch. But when love is free and unashamed, then it is made ten times more difficult, for lives are recognized as frank failures which once would have seemed useful and satisfactory. Fiction too becomes, not more interesting, but more important. It ceases completely to be what it always tends to be when opinion is fixed, namely, a mere illustration of the working out of social or moral 'laws'; it becomes frankly the record of individual souls in search of a successful way of life. It records, no doubt, more failures than successes, but it furnishes the best, and perhaps the only important material for the study of that art of life which grows ever more complicated as we demand that it be more complete and beautiful." (1)

No doubt some exception might be taken to the implied assumption that the "working out of social and moral laws" is either a non-existent or an undesirable phenomenon. The fact of the matter probably is that the present downward trend which is so alarming is due not at all to an absence of social and moral

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(1) The Nation: "Modern Love and Modern Fiction;" June 25, 1924.

laws, but to their inevitable working out. It is at this point that the great ethical prophets of all ages have taken their firm stand. The doctrine of no-law in the social and moral realm has its full quota of active proponents; the public needs writers and speakers who will once more appeal, with a clarity and conviction which old-time self-assurance often rendered trite and uninteresting, to the logic of cause and effect in character. It was not so much the fact that the righteous young hero of conventional fiction always came out on top, as the monotonous uniformity and sanctimonious moralizing with which he was made to do it, that renders "correct" or "mid-Victorian" fiction innane to a great many minds. One finds unmistakably the working out of social and moral laws in Shakespeare, and this fact is largely what gives his great dramas their element of timelessness. Shakespeare offers examples of ethical relativity, the evils of repression, and the beauty and fineness of a free emotional life; but he never made the mistake of supposing that the interplay of personalities was not governed by laws other than those merely of individual and momentary desire.

Surprizingly enough, we are told that the best modern fiction of the "free-expression" type is arriving at a near-asceticism. Referring to two typical young authors, Mr. Krutch says,

> "They are so completely unable to lose themselves carelessly in passion and so insistent upon the need for adjusting it somehow to the other interests of life" (he does not say, 'the interests of <u>others</u>') "that they strike one more as saints than as gallants, and their

> books are far more dulling than inflammatory."

The novels of one author

> "constitute so solemn a warning that one imagines him as thoroly bored with the exigencies of passion and more likely to make his disciples celibates than debauches." (1)

This is probably a case of a little knowledge grading into more, and it may progress far enough to see that the whole process must be re-established on grounds other than a mere naturalistic individualism, if satisfactory adjustments, either between interests or between personalities, are to be made. Lives are to be made "more complete and beautiful"; a novelist-philosopher of the type of Lawrence or Huxley, or even such as Dell, Dreiser or Anderson, proceeding on this as a conviction, cannot avoid disappointment in his present tack; nor can he until he find a truer individualism and a more rugged expressionism than any furnished from outside Christianity.

The idealism which spurns mere moral legalism, and which insists on an out-going, constructive, and if need be, a self-denying, expressionism is not new, but is as old as the spirit of Jesus. In so far as any "new morality" furthers this constructive and other-regarding ideal, it is following in the train of the prophets. As a reaction against negativism and tabu-ism, modern fiction-philosophy is serving a healthful purpose. As an expression of a desire for a new freedom in social relations, it

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(1) Ibid: The authors considered as typical by Mr. Krutch are D. H. Lawrence, and Adolus Huxley.

is often commendably human. But in the hands of the morally infant or senescent, it too often carries enough poison to warrant placing on the cover the skull and crossbones of ethical piracy.

But it is not only when the philosophy of freedom and self-expression falls into the hands of the "half-baked," and the indelicate finger of "little knowledge," unbacked by a healthy moral experience, enters into literature and motive-making, that red lights must be set at the peril-spots and a large "Detour" notice placed directly fore. The romantic temperament which chafes under compulsions and restraints of all kinds is also with us in every age. Very often it is the most striking mental type of its time. Romanticism, which "loves for love's sake," finds change the highest and sweetest reality of experience. Adler calls it "a certain emotional thin-skinnedness that chafes under binding ties, finds them intolerable, and seeks to shake them off."(1) It is here that one finds it necessary to resort to the logic of things as they are. Against the highest type of aesthetic-mindedness we must bring to bear a logic and an ethics which rests upon the conviction of reality and value in social relations. And in order to do this it will be found necessary to resort to the field of personal dynamics, or motive. For all moral conduct, from that of the most illiterate near-moron to that of the cultured literary critic, requires an emotional drive. It will be in every case a matter of the kind of

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(1) Reconstruction of the Spiritual Ideal: Page 62.

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emotional drive. Shall the dominant drive in private and public life be immediately instinctive, or shall it be mediated thru a process of purifying which requires negations, self-repressions, discipline, as well as some valid sort of individual self-expression? The tendency which has been discussed indicates the former alternative; a large amount of evidence, coming from the Religious experience of men and Nations leads to the conviction that, on the contrary there is a necessary element of repression in the development of a full and healthy human personality.

CHAPTER II.

SOME APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF MORAL MOTIVE.

The latest approved textbook of academic psychology defines motive as "a tendency towards a certain end - result or end-reaction, a tendency which is itself aroused by some stimulus, and which persists for a time because its end-reaction is not at once made."(1) This use of the term is broader than that of the older and more "intellectualistic" psychology, which was likely to think of motive in much the same way as Mr. Woodworth conceives "reason." "A reason," he says, "is thot-out and conscious, which a motive need not be. On the other hand, a reason does not become a motive unless it takes hold of us and arouses a genuine tendency towards the planned result."(2) As a spokesman for the modern movement in psychology which tends to extend the scope of the science into all life and action, and conversely, to seek the significance of life and action in the presence of intelligence, Mr. Woodworth makes his definition in terms of reaction-tendencies. It is this way of thinking about mind and action, which must characterize any modern attempt to deal with the conduct-situation. It is a logical necessity growing out of the new realization of the momentous place occupied in ordinary conduct by non-rational factors like instinct, emotion and habit. The reaction from a former, over-intellectualistic psychology has resulted in various conclusions. The

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(1) Psychology: R. S. Woodworth; pp.84-85.
(2) Ibid: Page 85.

scope of our conception of motive being enlarged, reasons - or the conscious aspects of action, purposiveness, control - and deliberation seem to suffer a reduction in their necessity, if not in their dignity. The place of reason and deliberation may be wholly transferred, and represented as lagging so far behind action in point of time as to serve merely as a justifier or apologist for it. One finds this sort of conclusion admirably suited to the emotional preconceptions of anti-repressionists. The sort of thinking which was under consideration in the first chapter likes to emphasize the claims of nature as embodied in impulse and instinct. The deliberation and foresight which have become synonymous with control and repression are conceived as of illusory value. As a matter of fact, of course, the psychology and philosophy behind this great movement are not simple. But our analysis has indicated that the situation is one which can best be attacked by way of the concept of motive. Many of us believe that the re-interpretation of reason and nature in relation to conduct has implications which are not at all disparaging toward rationality or even to a certain measure of repression. The question is, "what sort of morality is possible and desirable in view of the new found facts of human nature; and what motives shall be considered the proper and acceptable ones in this sort of morality?" The conditions in our rational life are such as to make the answer to this question a matter of practical and immediate importance.

II.

In the present chapter it is proposed to consider briefly

two or three leading contemporary conceptions of the approach to moral problems, with a view to finding what method and conclusions strike most nearly to the heart of this problem. The present conditions and the philosophy which underlies them have already been sketched, and it remains to attempt to delve a little more deeply into the underlying motives involved. What is the fundamental conception of human nature, life and destiny that supports this type of approach,- one which we have made bold to brand as careless and in a certain measure degenerate? Another sort of preconception will also be considered: namely, that which causes one to come at moral problems by way of social study, and offers a way by which a moral order is established thru the control of social conditions. A third theory comes from those ethical teachers who look to intelligence for the solution of our moral problems. Of this type, Mr. John Dewey is an outstanding representative. Returning once more to the individualism of early Christian experience, we shall lastly call attention to a recently expressed viewpoint in a book by Mr. Marshall Dawson. This striking recall of men to a belief in degeneration and in the need for "backbone" in moral life will perhaps furnish a needed complement to the background of our modern thinking about human nature and conduct.

III.

The present tendency to stress freedom and individual expression as the means to what may be called "salvation" is not by any means an isolated phenomenon. Those elements which have contributed most prominently to its vogue will be discuss-

ed in the following chapter; but its permanently standing presuppositions may be considered here. Broadly speaking, there is a periodic swing of human interest between nature in its narrower connotation, and man. Prof. Palmer, in his eminently satisfactory Nature of Goodness, devotes the concluding chapter to a critical review of this pendulum movement in history. "Under one analysis," he says, "two antithetic worlds emerge, a world of nature and of spirit, the former guided by blind forces, the latter self-managed."(1) This is the essentially Christian conception, and the one which underlays the thinking of early Christian thinkers. "Yet," continues Prof. Palmer, "it must be owned that during the last few centuries doubts have risen about the justice of this Christian ideal. The simple conception of a world of spirit and a world of nature arrayed against each other, the one of them exactly what the other is not, the world of spirit the superior, the world of nature to be frowned upon, used possibly, but always in subordination to spiritual purposes,- this view-- has been falling into disrepute."(2) Traced in the fine arts, poetry, painting and music, this reaction away from a view of nature and spirit as antithetical, has moved to certain extremes. In our own time, "natural science" is the leading field of knowledge. Great non-human forces are so commonly investigated and harnessed, and their use is so universal,

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(1) George Herbert Palmer: The Nature of Goodness; Chapter 7, p.193
(2) Ibid: p. 195-6.

that one sometimes wonders whether perhaps they have not harnessed, and are using, us.(1) Eighteenth Century Naturalism was saved from anarchism by an intellectualistic psychology and a proximity to settled standards of belief. But it is reflected in the exaltation of the primitive. "Back to Nature" was the watchword of Rousseau and the deists; and education and religion came in for their share of influence from this source. Pope's phenomenal Indian was supposed to be the epitome of virtue, intelligence and serenity. But the eighteenth century attempt to return to nature was not made on the very crest of the wave of scientific knowledge which included in its scope the nature of man as animal. The psychology of this age placed a new value on nature, but of man, intellect still remained the crowning glory. Religion was not condemned because it was found incipient in savagery: but savagery was extolled, because it was that its simplicity and naivete' were more truly religious than civilization.

The change which nineteenth century scientific advance brot out gave an entirely new tack to the glorification of nature. The older conception of man had left him intact; if fear, pride

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(1) See Butler's Erewhon; also David Grayson: "The Man in the Glass Cage," American Magazine January, 1925. He is watching a control operator in a great mill. "... it was not he that controlled the machinery, but the machinery that controlled him. He was as much a part of it as any lever, roller, pin or cog. Instead of having his consciousness, his understanding, sharpened by the marvels of his nights in this place, his personality seemed literally effaced."

and selfishness were the ruling motives of life-according to Hobbes, Bentham, Mill -, at least it remained a unity. Man still maintained essentially a coordinated selfhood of intellect, will and emotion; the animal was no kin of his. But the idea of evolution has brot in a new conception, which not only acknowledges a kinship with the brutes, but analyzes man's nature in such a way that the only vital and dynamic elements of his life belong in the lower realm. Obviously there is no inherent evil or wickedness in such a state of affairs. So far as fact is fact, and knowledge is knowledge, every fair-minded observer desires and welcomes new and helpful analyses in every realm of knowledge. But the change which has come over the idea of man demands that it should be re-examined from the standpoint of values. What occasions the fears and pessimism of the spiritually-minded at present, is that the re-interpretation of nature is being attempted without sufficient background of spiritual perception. It is the content, and not the form, of an attempted return to nature, which one is forced to look upon as unfortunate in the case of individualistic expressionism.

It is the present contention, therefore, that insofar as the expressionistic ideal is an expression of a historic and valuable outlook upon nature, it is not inherently a false ideal. So long, furthermore, as it insists upon stressing personal values, as a part of human nature, it is on the right track. But when personal values become identified with the free play of instincts, emotions, and ambitions, then this historic form is given a content which assumes negative value for morality and

religion.

The answer to our essential questions is then for this type of ethics something like this: 'The new idea of human nature, resulting from modern psychological analysis, shows us that the only conceivable morality is that which works toward the fullest development of each individual nature. Give free scope to each instinct and power. Repress nothing, lest some spark of genius be crushed out. The highest aim of every soul is to free the body and enjoy it.' The danger of such a philosophy, as has been pointed out, lies in the convenience with which it can be appropriated to the desires of a bestial, weak, selfish or unprincipled individualism.

IV.

If one school of ethics offers an answer to the moral question in terms of the individual nature, there is another type of morals which begins in opposite fashion with society. The English writer who has been the champion of anti-intellectualism in the analysis of individuals has also been the chief proponent in England and America of the view that the elements of individual action and character are essentially social. Hence we have a "social psychology." But for Professor McDougall, the genetic process goes from the person to society. Social institutions and customs have their origin and their reason in the makeup of the individual constituents of society; and an argument is often found for social fixedness in the supposed immutability of instinct. Professor McDougall recognizes, however that the individual cannot be explained apart from his social environ-

ment.

> "It was, I think," he says, "mainly because the older moralists neglected to take sufficiently into account the moral tradition and the way in which it becomes impressed upon us, and because they treated the individual in artificial abstraction from the social relations thru which his moral sentiments are formed, that they were led to maintain the hypothesis of some special faculty, the conscience, or the moral sense or instinct, or the moral consciousness, in seeking to account for moral conduct." (1).

We believe that the attempt to do away with a distinctive moral consciousness by explaining it in terms of sentiments, or instinct combinations, is also a failure; but in this statement of Professor McDougall, we see the recognition of a new and potent reality in individual conduct, over and above that which is recognized by the out-and-out individualists. Society is viewed as exerting a decisive influence upon the formation of sentiment and character.

But the great modern philosophy of society is found in France, where the sucessors of Comte-Durkheim, Belot, Levy-Bruhl - are laboring to convert ethics into a science, and are succeeding in filling the categories of social morality with vital new content. It is not possible here to go deeply into this movement. It may be characterized broadly as positivistic in method and social in emphasis. It goes to the opposite ex-

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(1) McDougall: Social Psychology; p.228.

treme from that occupied by individual expressionism; where the latter looks upon social molding forces as impediments to true genius, social positivism places upon them the weight of sole validity and value. The social factors in conduct are the prime objects of research and analysis. The "nature" studied by social ethics is "social nature." According to M. Levy-Bruhl,

> "Man can no more easily dispose of social nature than he can dispose of physical nature, and the only means of conquering the one as the other is first to discover its laws....The reformer will subordinate himself to the sociologist." (1)

> The facts of social relationship are inevitable and all-influential, hence "Ethics requires no more 'founding' ", (i.e. in a priori principles), "than 'nature' in the physical sense of the word." (2)

The two great difficulties which attach themselves to this social positivism are these: (a) From the standpoint of the individual, it leaves no place for change which is due to individual initiative. The democratic theory of genius is held to so closely that personality, either in thot or action, is unduly subordinated. To quote M. Levy-Bruhl once more:

> "A social reality which existed before him, and will survive him, is imposed on any normal individual being in any society, ours for instance. He knows neither its origin nor its structure; he must conform to all its prescriptions, obligations, interdictions, morals, laws, manners and conventions, under penalty of various punishments, some external, some within himself, more or less scattered, but which make themselves felt in the most incontestable

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(1) Levy-Bruhl: Ethics and Moral Science; English translation - p.86.
(2) Ibid; p. 154

fashion, by the effects they produce, by the intimidation they exercise." (1)

(b) In the second place, a strictly scientific social ethics, such as that represented typically by Levy-Bruhl, shares the lack which characterizes all scientific approach; namely, it can view standards and values existentially only; it can make social and moral values the object of a purely phenomenal investigation, but it cannot, by the very nature of the approach, make any evaluation. Now the weakness of traditional ethics has undoubtedly been its disregard of social facts, and its undue emphasis on certain abstract aspects of individual-moral experience, such as conscience, duty, deliberation, goodness, happiness. But the characteristic of which these familiar concepts are symbols is that which many believe to be the differentia of evaluation. Value does not enter at all into a true scientific investigation; primitive tabu and Christian love stand on a par as objects of study. Social positivism, therefore, with its emphasis on non-evaluative study, offers no solution whatever to the question of comparative moral values. It can discover, examine, analyze and trace to an origin any number of moral ideals and motives; but it cannot make such ideals and motives live for any individual, nor can it consistently offer changes or improvements in existing social systems.

This second great tendency in moral study is then subject to the criticism that it is incapable of offering a content for

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(1) Ibid: p. 154

the form which it offers in analysis. Moral conduct is native to all persons living in social relationships; morality is not only real, but inevitable. Social nature is as valid as physical nature, and its demands upon the individual just as insistent. But there is not provision in this philosophy for the very truth which is most characteristic of individualism at the opposite pole. Immediate experience, with its conviction of values, its inventiveness, its creativeness and privacy, is too lightly considered. Present, already-existent systems of conduct are analyzed, but no attempt is made to determine what motives are good and what bad, whether this restriction is right or wrong, or that social habit desirable or undesirable.

V.

A school of ethics that is extremely popular at the present time is that which makes intelligence the Summum Bonum of conduct. The social psychology of Mr. Dewey posits impulse as the fundamental force behind all behavior. Organized and coordinated within individual life by habit, this primal force is capable either of rational direction on the one hand, or of irrational inflexibility or capriciousness on the other. Habit gives meaning to conduct. Intelligence delivers habit from fixity by furnishing the motive for adaptation to changed conditions. Thus while primitive impulse, under the command of a slightly less primitive system of habits, permeates and energizes all of life, the meaning of the whole comes from the continual presence of foresight and deliberation.

Mr. Dewey has avoided both the extreme anti-intellectualism of the "back to nature" advocates, and the over-intellectualism

and lack of solid moral content which characterizes French positivism. He views as a caricature of moral transvaluation the school which "abrogates objective intelligence in behalf of sentiment, and withdraws into little coteries of emancipated souls."(1) There is nothing attractive, from this point of view, in the idea that unrestraint in satisfaction of appetites is identical with free realization of individuality. On the other hand, by allying intellect with the warmest and most intimate elements of individual experience - emotion, impulse, feeling- and so arranging his analysis that rationality is seen ideally to permeate all sorts and degrees of action, Mr. Dewey avoids the necessity of having to apologize to the ordinary man for the existence of theoretical morals.

This conception of reason, or intelligence, as a constituent of all conduct is one element of the modern unification of life. Traditional ethics circumscribed morality too closely in defining ethical conduct variously in terms of duty, perfection, obedience to the Divine commands, or the pursuit of personal happiness. As a result, practical morality has often suffered a complete amputation from the over-lofty ideals set up by theory. The ends of action in every department of life are capable of moral interpretation and hence have moral significance. It is necessary to recognize both the importance of irrational factors in action - impulse, habit, emotion, feeling, sentiment - and the essential character of intelligence

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(1) Human Nature and Conduct: p.7

as the value-giving and value-conserving constituent. One finds this conviction strongly expressed thruout Mr. Dewey's philosophy. Life is, or at least should be, a moral unity thruout, by virtue of the existence in the entire process of deliberation and control; irrational factors which form the body of the system are organized into a happy unity by intelligence.

> "Rationality," he says,".....is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires. 'Reason', as a noun signifies the happy co-operation of a multitude of dispositions, such as sympathy, curiosity, exploration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit- to follow things thru-circumspection, to look about at the content, etc etc."(1)

> "Reason," again," is not an antecedent force which serves as a panacea. It is a laborious achievment of habit needing continually to be worked over. A balanced arrangement of propulsive activities manifested in deliberation - namely, reason - depends upon a sensitive and proportionate emotional sensitiveness." (2)

Thot and energy working together in a harmonious relation of superordination and subordination respectively--this is the essence of truly moral conduct.

It is here that America's most versatile and least impractical College Professor places the emphasis in moral action. Morality is social, active, all-inclusive, but above all, intelligent. Mr. Dewey's ethical philosophy is strong where traditional practice is indisputably weak. Morality is too generally nothing but blind, slavish conformity to what

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(1) Human Nature and Conduct: p. 196
(2) Ibid: p. 198

is customary in certain realms of life, while in other, less fixed but increasingly important regions, selfish impulse is allowed to set the standard. In other cases the lack of intelligent control results in casuistic cavil. Destructive negativism takes the place of positive virtue.

We may well ask whether Mr. Dewey, in offering intelligence as the solution to our complex problem of conduct, has been willing to go quite far enough in recognizing those distinctively spiritual ideals to which he is temperamentally disinclined. If rationality "is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit," but consists rather in the fortunate cooperation of various dispositions, what is the force which whips recalcitrant impulses into line and by pushing certain dispositions aside, allows others, conceived as more desirable, to occupy the place of action? So far as I have been able to find from Mr. Dewey's theory of ethics, merely intelligent action allows for deliberation, foresight, spontaneity, flexibility; but the propulsive force behind intelligent action, as behind any action, is still the power of impulse and habit. The problem is to discover how an admittedly "laborious achievement," like intelligence, can get along without what the ordinary man thinks of as "repression." The liberation of impulse, so that balked habits may be reorganized smoothly, and the fixation of habit, so that desirable dispositions may be cultivated and preserved, - this is the work of intellect. The expenditure of energy in the process requires effort; the more intelligent the action, the greater the effort and the larger the number of

tendencies that must be suppressed. It is to this extremely important implication of intelligent action that Mr. Dewey notoriously finds himself objecting. Temperamentally, Dewey is thoroly positive, expressionistic. Practically, he is forced to recognize the vital necessity for effort, the source of which he does not want to recognize as distinctively moral. The differentia of morality is therefore thrown back upon intelligence, which, according to ordinary observation, either may or may not be of positive moral value.

Broadly speaking, Mr. Dewey not only fails in furnishing us with standards which are uniquely moral, but he also insists that there are none outside of intelligent action itself. Reasonable conduct is morally valuable; the ends sought in such conduct are variable, and to fix them is to kill them. Ends do not worry Mr. Dewey, since it is not in them that value resides in the last analysis. The moral motive is not that which tends to an end-result having moral value, but is a constituent of any action that is intelligent. Thus, this form of social psychology extends the significance of morality into all the aspects of life and action. But in placing a premium on mechanics and attention to the purely logical results of action, it threatens to overwhelm the major, moral meanings and aims of life under a flood of calculations, which themselves ultimately lose their significance by breaking contact with those major realities.

VI.

It is a mistake, according to Mr. Marshall Dawson, "to assume that people have self-acting moral power, when in fact

they are not self-active morally, but slip along in grooves of inertia or custom." This statement is one which is typical of a book recently published by Mr. Dawson, called "Nineteenth Century Evolution and After." Here we come across a new kind of pessimism, and another sort of dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs. In modern ethical theory, we have had almost every element of the moral situation at one time or another set forward as central, with the exception of this one-moral effort. The desire on the part of theorists to get rid of this factor in moral life has resulted largely in its being left out of practical conduct as well, and it is these practical fruits that we are now gathering on our news-stands and in our police courts. Mr. Dawson champions the cause of a return to the centrality of moral effort, - the re-recognition of the necessity for "backbone" in conduct.

Backbone obviously never develops in an individual who either (a) believes that it is not necessary to develop one; or (b) thinks that it is useless to try to resist the forces which press upon him from without; or (c) clings to the idea that he can have a morally successful life without specifically developing moral backbone; or (d) remains unconvinced of the general desirability of possessing a vertebrate character. Now the philosophy and the psychology of our day have not done a great deal toward allaying such beliefs and convictions. Of the general tendencies just reviewed, each represents some way, or combination of ways, of escape from the need for this effort. The expressionist, for example, sees no need for selecting the more difficult of two courses of action, when his impulse directs

nim unmistakably to the easier, and when even the motive for unifying and correlating impulses is that of more effective impulsiveness. The positivist, on the other hand, begins with the presupposition of social determination, and ends with urging, not individual effort, but social control. Moral problems gain largely from both these points of view, as well as from all the approaches which moralists have made to the problem. But it is necessary to stress also the crying need for a new return to the individual will. Mr. Dawson offers such a return.

We have reacted too far from Puritanism; for while the Puritan fortified conviction with a dogmatic assurance, and identified the will of God with the most austere morality, he did at least hold convictions. He had not progressed far enough in speculative ethics to have lost his belief in the primacy of practical results over theoretical conclusions. Jonathan Edwards has no compunctions in arguing from doctrinal infidelity to political unrighteousness. That good conduct issues from good doctrine is a perfectly good argument for the former; and the motives furnished by a theology, if they result in moral conduct, are thereby seen to furnish justification for that theology. In a sermon preached in 1794 before the governor and general assembly of Connecticut, he says:

> "Now to restrain from vices of this description, (injustice, fraud, robbery), from all vices practiced in private, and from vice in general, nothing is so useful as a full belief in a final judgment, and of a subsequent state of rewards and punishments, in which all sins not renounced by sincere repentance shall be punished, and every man shall receive according to that which he does in the body, whether it

> be good or evil." "The best and perhaps the only remedy for....(various civil vices)...is a full belief of the divine universal providence, of the accountableness of all men to God for all their conduct, and of a future equal retribution." (1)

There can be no doubt that this sort of argument was very effective. A senator Fall or a general Forbes could not have left that presence without at least a severe dent in his self-esteem. But our present tendency is to separate so distinctly the theoretical problems of individual and social conduct from the actual practical results which flow from them that theory becomes remote from life, and life becomes, as it were, "dis-ethicized." The abstraction of intellectual activity about morals from intelligent and sincere moral activity itself may lead to an Abe Reuff (2) or a Leopold-Loeb combination, but it will not produce another Jonathan Edwards.

The great contribution of Twentieth Century ethics to the problem of moral living is not so much the one that has stood out so prominently, - scientific and comparative study of moralities, - as the conviction that has risen out of such study to the effect that natural forces cannot account for moral advance. This statement indicates a direct contradiction to some, and a decided addition to other, of the points of view we have been examining. Two headings might be made to cover the most striking novelties in this modern ethical study. Both have already been indicated.

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(1) Works: Boston; 1854. Vol. 2, pp. 186-7
(2) See Dawson, Ibid; p.52

In the first place, there is the re-discovery of the unified man, so strikingly illustrated by Professor Dewey. But we have also contended that the unification extends still farther, so that not only "heart" and "mind," but also "backbone" must be included in the wholeness which constitutes a man. Abstraction from actual moral strife has caused some ethical thinkers to deprecate conviction, moral steadfastness, integrity, and moral austerity of any kind, in the interest of a free moral enquiry. This is nothing more nor less than the carrying over of scientific agnosticism into conduct, a procedure which is destructive to conduct because it denatures it. Action proceeds on pragmatic or practical premises, not on hypotheses and probabilities. Even a truly scientific agnosticism proceeds to act upon the hypothesis which is most in accord with the evidence. But the philosophy class-room has often perverted this policy of "no-dogma" into a doctrine of "no-conviction," under which it is difficult, if not impossible, to justify ways either of good or of evil.

"In the controversy between 'Adam' (human nature) and evolution, Adam will have the last word," says Mr. Dawson.(1) Adam represents the nature of humanity, - "a compendium of evolution" - the result of ages of struggle and failure, climbing, slipping, and going on again. Adam has survived as a unity of head, heart and spine; by attempting to neglect the latter element a certain type of evolutionary theory, with its philos-

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(1) Ibid: p.57

ophical children, has threatened to do away with one of the chief differentiae of moral conduct.

Secondly, there is the renewed realization that science does not, after all, furnish a propaganda against moral effort, struggle, ethical earnestness and upward striving. The Evolution of Herbert Spencer was optimistic. "Progress is not an accident, nor a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity." It proceeds menhanically, according to laws, regardless of human interference or co-operation. The present results of this sort of theory are not confined to the few who still find enjoyment in the sweeping grandeur of Spencer's cosmic scheme; they are seen in our life in politics, industry, religion and the family. To seek the good, or do one's duty, or follow one's conscience at any cost, is not necessary in a world which will progress regardless of individual moral decisions or actions.

Twentieth Century science has returned inevitably to "degeneration" as a factor in the cosmic drama. The "survival of the fittest" has included as a correlary principle the destruction of the unfit. This is where we have often left the matter and with a gesture of dismissal, have returned to the study of those who did survive. When applied to social nature, the tendency has been to forget that human progress like that in every lower realm of reality, involves degeneration in the absence of certain qualities. Progress, whether sub-human or human, individual or social, requires the presence of a certain nexus which connects each stage with that just higher. Failure to attain to

the peculiar quality of the higher stage has meant non-survival; attainment, which involves the ability to see and to fight towards the higher point, has been the mark of those who survive.

Applied to moral life, this doctrine means that mere individuality, mere intelligence or mere sociality, all of which are the high peaks of relatively lower stages, and belong without effort to the total nature of man in society, are surpassed as moral ends, and that a strictly moral reality, carrying with it a set of effective moral motives, must be sought outside of and above, yet fully inclusive of, these ends. It is this truth that I believe has a peculiar applicability to our present situation. We have allowed certain lazy implications of an incomplete biological doctrine to lull us into false security, forgetting that the picture of the centuries exhibits a double aspect.

"Shape by shape with brow uplifted,
One by one where night is rifted,
Pass the victors, many gifted,
Where the heaven opens wide;
While below them, fallen or seated,
Mummy-like or shadow-sheeted,
Stretch the lines of the defeated,
Scattered on the mountain-side."

Madison Cawein: "Attainment."

CHAPTER III

THE ANTECEDENTS AND CLIMAX OF EXPRESSIONISM.

In the last section we considered various modern contributions to the theory of moral motive. These were seen to be different approaches to the problem in the light of differing fundamental preconceptions. One type came at the question from the standpoint of nature, anotner from that of society, another from the viewpoint of intelligence, and a fourtn from an emphasis upon the distinctively moral quality of effort. It has appeared, and will again appear, that a satisfactory conception of the form and content of morality must include the essential aspects of each of these approaches; but that no one alone can give a complete set of principles for action. In the concluding pages, the purpose will be to show that Christianity summarizes in its own spirit the best points of all. The present section deals with three outstanding antecedents of modern anti-repressionism, and with its "coming of age" in psychoanalysis.

I.

Expressionism has already received attention from the illustrative and interpretive angles. Let us now look briefly at some main movements which have aided the rise of the present extreme type.

(a) PAGANISM. A leading American sociologist, Professor Ellwood, draws a picture of striking contrasts in which he sets the Christian "pattern" or ideal over against an opposing tendency which he calls "paganism."

> "What do we mean by paganism'?" he asks. "Fundamentally we mean the type of social life and ethical ideals which Machiavelli and Nietzsche discovered, or thought they discovered, in the civilization of Greece and Rome previous to the advent of Christianity - a type of society in other words, in which power and pleasure are frankly avowed as the ends of individual and group action." (1)

That this type of ideal comes into the American mind by way of Nietzsche and his followers does not so much matter; although it might be found to matter considerably if its vogue grew to the proportions it had assumed in the Germany of 1914. The signigicant origins of this strictly anti-Christian philosophy of power and pleasure are undoubtedly to be found in Greece and Rome.

> "Greece, with its sensuous aestheticism, and Rome, with its brutal predatory militarism, have been perhaps the chief sources of corruption in the traditions of our civilization; but the Teutonic tribesmen of the north with their predatory traditions might be considered as furnishing a third source of paganism almost as important as the first two, were it not for the fact that these tribesmen later accepted Greeco-Roman civilization and largely supplanted the models of their culture by the models of Greece and Rome." (2)

Paganism is in fact the ethical equivalent of barbarism as a stage of culture, (3) and our own civilization has for its major background this barbaric culture.

The relation of paganism, so defined, to the temper of expressionism is obvious. The recognition of social obligations, the motives of forbearance, sympathy and self-sacrifice,

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(1) The Reconstruction of Religion; p. 96
(2) Ibid; p.97
(3) Cf. Ibid; p.97f.

do not have much place in the frankly pagan society. Obligation if to self, both in the case of the individual and of the state. "Aestheticism" in art does not seek to make any contribution to the whole of society, morally, religiously or politically. It is "art for art's sake." Truth and beauty become aimless and their expression increasingly inept.

> "In America," says Mr. Stuart Sherman, "it will be found more and more that the artist who does not in some fashion concern himself with truth, morals and democracy, is unimportant, is ignoble." (1)

When transferred into the realm of the philosophy of life, the aestheticism, so typical of Greek paganism, becomes self-centeredness and self-seeking. It is just this centrality of each individual in his own view which draws the condemnation of our own better philosophers upon the type of individualism most common in America, be it in business, or politics.

The artistic self-centeredness which is on one side of paganism would be effeminate and self-eliminating unless it were supplemented by the evaluation placed on power. The hardihood and courageous virtues of military Rome and of the European hordes furnish the balance which renders paganism fascinating to the masculine type of mind. It is the lack of this in essence which Nietzsche and many others consider the fatal flaw in Christianity. The criticism is a serious one, especially when one views certain of the cults which have sprung up based on a feminine misunderstanding of Jesus. But even this preponderance of the "gentler" virtues in Christian-

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(1) The Genius of America; p. 26

ity is distinctly antithetical to the character of the aesthete, since it involves both other-centeredness and force of character.

American expressionism has thus appropriated influence from commerce and industry fully as much as from art and pleasuré. We have been free, largely from the bane of European civilization - military intrigue and national self-aggrandisment. We popularly pride ourselves on having fought no wars for the extension of national power, and we fight shy of any imputation of "militarism." The barbaric element, however, is soon discovered by any European visitor, who sees at a glance that what Europe suffers in political paganism, we are afflicted with in the form of commercialism. Commercialism, no less than militarism, is a vice, simply because it runs in a vicious circle involving power, pleasure in that power, more power, more pleasure in it, and so on, ad infinitum. It is anti-Christian, as militarism is anti-Christian because it places pleasure and power foremost. It emphasizes self-expression in the sense of gathering in to oneself as much goods as possible, and if there be competitors, - why, "the devil take the hindmost."

III.

The strangest thing about our pagan civilization is its strange bedfellows. The friends of Odysseus shook their heads sadly at the sight of an ass and an ox yoked together to his plow. But no more thoroly inappropriate combination was ever witnessed than that of this pagan expressionistic, individual-

ism with the religion which Christians have believed to have transforming power for persons and societies. We have often a vague feeling that there are inconsistencies in our present life; when faced with such facts as are set forth in Chapter 1, we feel that the existing state is bad, even tho we dread more the remedy suggested. May it not be that expressionism fails as an answer because its content is pagan, and that, as Professor Ellwood suggests,

> "The Barbarian mind ---- explains the anachronisms in our present----culture. But the rational civilized mind, "we agree with him again, " if it continues to learn, will ultimately reject this socially unworkable pattern of barbarism for those first tested and proved workable in primary groups." (as, e.g. the family) (1).

III.

(b) HEDONISM. The contribution of Utilitarian Ethics has been not so much one of new content as it has been that of "making paganism respectable." I refer of course to that aspect of utilitarianism of which Bentham spoke when he said,

> "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, and on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne." (2)

This type of hedonism explains to a great extent why a distinctly pagan ideal of life exists alongside of Christianity with so little appearance of incompatibility. It has two

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(1) Christianity and Social Science; p. 46
(2) The first few lines of his Principles of Morals and Legislation.

elements. In the first place, it affirms that the chief motives of action are pleasure and pain, and it proceeds in the second place, to claim that they are the sole means for judging the rightness and wrongness of the results of action. That is, Bentham maintains both a psychological and an ethical hedonism. Now, while modern scientific psychology has long since repudiated the existential element in this combination, along with its intellectualism and its confusion of pleasure with happiness (1), nevertheless sufficient momentum attaches to the evaluative aspect of the theory to make it influential and important in our present situation.

The descendents of Utilitarianism were not so much the ethicists, John Stuart Mill, Sidgwick, et al., as the practical politicians and economists who taught the doctrine that

> "thru the wise and beneficent arrangement of Providence, men.... do the greatest service to the public when they are thinking of nothing but their own gain." (2)

This is obviously expressionism enthroned so attractively, that no successive generation including the present - has been able to escape its direct or indirect influence. Mr. Wallas says that "the conscious intellectual life of the average Englishman is still often spent among the ruins of Utilitarianism." (3) Certain it is that in America the identification of individual ambition and social welfare, of pleasure and the good, of self-seeking and benevolence, have done much to encour-

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(1) See e. g. Graham Wallas: The Great Society; p. 94 ff.
(2) Whately: Easy Letters on Money Matters for the use of the young, (1842) p.52
(3) Op. cit; p. 95

age the barbaric conception of values in commerce, industry, personal relations and even in religious observance. Utilitarianism invested the pagan ideal of pleasure and power with all the authority which a respectable psychology and a superficially valid ethical principle could lend. In our own day, that psychology and that ethics are both superceded, but the influences are still powerful in our economic, political, and recreative life, and we are still unable to cultivate a public conscience which reacts unfavorably upon such unadequate ideals of pleasure and happiness as are furnished by traditional Utilitarianism.

V.

(c) ETHICAL NATURALISM. Utilitarianism is related to political and economic paganism largely thru Hobbes, who was able to find no ethical values apart from individual pleasure. Law and custom furnished for Hobbes the standard of conduct, because they were the deliberate provision of society for the preservation of each individual's happiness. Hobbes' emphasis on good and evil as the products of evaluations and as deriving their quality from the quality of such evaluations is typical of a tendency which is outstanding in our present day ethics. It may be called ethical naturalism. In every substantial particular, modern naturalism in ethics follows the principles established by Hobbes. His statement of them is so classical that it endures repetition.

> "Whatever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that it is which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil, and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any com-

> mon rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it, or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall consent to set up and make his sentence the rule thereof." (1)

The essence of this absolute relativity is the twofold principle that (1) there is nothing good or evil for the individual but pleasurable impression makes it so, and that (2) there is no social morality apart from law. Both have consequences of great moment for practical conduct.

The first finds expression in the popular idea that conflicts of ethical standards are only clashes of temperament. Differences in ethical value are reduced to aesthetic distinctions and hence lose altogether their moral character. This type of thinking undoubtedly received influential support from some statements of William James.(2) But the general temper of James' ethical philosophy does not perpetuate this impression. One perceives rather a basing of its claim to freedom of conviction upon a profound faith in realities not recognized by a non-humanistic naturalism. James' was an empiricism which went beyond the kind of experience known by current scientific philosophy, and fought for the validity of spiritual things in experience. If values are based purely on individual valuations, everyone's values are as good as anyone's else, and temperament judges as

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(1) "Leviathan": English Works; (1840) Volume III, p.30
(2) e.g. Pragmatism; Chapter 1.

good or bad that which suits or unsuits itself.(1)

This cannot be the philosophy of a deep-wrought life. If fundamental attitudes toward life partake of social influences, intelligent revisions, or true intuitions of reality, these attitudes must belong, not to the unsubstantial and fleeting nature of individual preference, but rather partake of the stability and objectivity found in institutions, idea-systems and the hard realities of daily life. Moral clashes are contests of tempers, the sources of which must be sought in such solid facts as individual and social inheritance, in habit, intelligence and intuition, in nature, thot and religion.

The second principle of ethical naturalism is that law precedes morality. Logically, this is a corollary of the first contention, for if there is no objective good or right, but the latter proceed out of individual pleasure, then there can be no social good except that which comes from a deliberate "pooling" of evaluations. This is what occurs in the "social contract," and what for Hobbes lies at the base of government and social mutuality.

There is an element of this in Dewey, in his emphasis on existing social arrangements. It is also tacit in social positivism. A recent article by Dr. Stephen Pepper in The International Journal of Ethics (2) stands frankly upon a Hobbesian basis when

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(1) Cf. Hume: Treatise of Human Nature; Bk.1, Part 3, §8; Part 4, § 7. Also D. W. Prall: A Study in the Theory of Value. Dr. Prall reduces all values-intellectual, moral, religious- to the type of the aesthetic.

(2) International Journal of Ethics: "The Boundaries of Society," July, 1922.

it affirms tha t international morality is non-existent pending the fixation of an international legal code.

Being legalistic, ethical naturalism deals only in externals. It is like all naturalism in its attempt to interpret stages of reality in terms of relatively lower stages. As philosophic behaviorism tends to stress physiology and positivistic sociology to stress instinctive and other sub-human forces, so naturalistic ethics lays emphasis on law. Law, fear, and force belong to the stage of barbarism, and no law which fails to rest ultimately on its own inherent validity can attain the status called moral. For conformity to law from fear or by force is legal, but not moral. Might may very well make right in law, and this is in fact the implication of ethical naturalism. In the truly moral realm, however, right depends on no other evidence than its own; it is not made by might or by law, and stands on a plane unattainable by lesser forms of social mutuality.

VI.

(d) PSYCHOANALYSIS. The "sore thumb" on the hand of contemporary expressionism is unequivocably the psychoanalytic psychology, and it is this which furnishes a fourth and final element in the analysis. The transformation of psychoanalytic method into a psychological and ethical philosophy has done more than any other thing to bring about the issue which inspired this paper. That issue is one of the most vital in our contemporary moral situation; for we have on the one hand psychoanalysts insisting that repression is the root of all sorts of evils, from

nightmares to feeble-mindedness; and on the other hand we have orthodox psychology, medicene, religion and "common sense" all "pulling togetner" for the validity and necessity of repression. In psychoanalysis expressionism becomes self-conscious - sometimes flagrantly so.

There is no need for entering into a discussion of the psycholanalytic theory, since we are interested here only in its ethics. Psychoanalysis arose in the field of mental pathology, and it frankly seeks to account for normal behavior in terms of abnormal phenomena. It proceeds on a principle which is the direct antithesis of the "idealist" one, that human nature is to be judged in the light of its highest manifestations. Psychoanalysts rather discount goodness in the ordinary sense as a pathological symptom, and look upon unrestrained impulsiveness as the normal and healthy mode of behavior. The "libido" is king, and whatever morality there is, exists in the suppression of the "censor" and leaving a clear track for impulse. Complexes are the "social evil," since they result from the damming up of emotional streams by the disapprovals of society. Conscience is supplanted by the censor, which plays the part of the villian in the plot. It belongs not to the individual, but to the artificial accretion which social opinions and condemnations have forced upon him. Psychoanalysis is fundamentally expressionistic, because as a method it means the discovery of suppressed knot-constellations and the eventual relief of the patient by his being permitted to manifest the hitherto buried impulse.

VII.

The ethical meaning of psychoanalysis is so clear that one is not surprized to find such expressions of its implication as that of Mr. Schmalhausen in the "Psychoanalytic Review."(1) Let me simply quote from this revealing article some scattered portions which I believe express the total spirit of the author.

> "We are all incorrigibly moral. The worst of it is that we are proud of our incorrigibility..... Pretense is the key to man's conduct in a so-called civilized society.....The primal essence of all morality is the need of approval. Morality may be difined as the Art of Self-Approval." The following are characterizations of morality: "....a tyrranous code of agreements. It simplifies life by standardizing conduct,.....surrounds youth's impulsive experiences with fringes of righteousness, the adornment and consolation of make-believe characters..... is the hegomony of inherited customs."

"Conventional goodness" is the ban of psychoanalysts. The distinction between goodness and conventional goodness seems not to be made. The "good" are characteristically charged with hypocricy, insincerity and fiendish delight in the suffering of "sinners."

> "Half the intense delight of conventionally good people is illegitimate, snatched as it roguishly is from the unruly deeds of the dare-devils...Serious moral natures are hunters-by- instinct....Conventionally moral persons are strong prohibitionists in public. They are not such nice teetotalers in private. A sanctified and corrupting duplicity mars their lowliest pretenses. Morality immortalizes the congenial folly of ignoring the beam in our own eye and attending (how passionately) to the mote in our neighbor's... Conventional morality has its deepest roots in the morbid desire for self-approval and self-aggrandizement, not in the love of virtue....Morality's inner

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(1) Volume VIII, pp. 383-406. October, 1921.

> erruption consists in this: it sucks its pleasure from another's pain."

The strange and wonderful thing about all this is that it corresponds so fully to the ordinary, or conventionally, moral man's condemnation of what he calls "mere manners," or "hypocricy", or "externalism" - those duplicitous evils which the normal spirit in our "so-called civilized society" detests heartily. The thorogoing psychoanalyst explains by saying that what men hate, they really down in their hearts, admire and seek. The universality of evil and heart-duplicity **is** the reason why it is universally, (or <u>almost</u> universally) frowned upon.

What on the negative side is the discrediting of all conformists, (whether consciously or unconsciously hypocritical and cruel), is on the positive side an apologetic <u>de luxe</u> for the lack of moral sense and backbone:

> "We know that individuals are victims of inherited passions so rapacious that will-power- or the power of expending one's energy in equally passionate but less dangerous modes - has been impotent to interpose its vetoes. We know that instincts and impulses and habits are coersive forces of the first magnitude. We know that will-power is at best an inefficient instrument. We now realize that the mind's conscious power is small; its unconscious tendencies all-powerful. We understand (thanks to psycho-analytic research) that the process of inhibition is fraught with peril to the human incalcubably beyond he had ever imagined possible.....We know now that the whole tragedy of human existence is largely beyond individual control."

The remedy lies in the frank renunciation of all conceptions of right behavior which are tainted by the experience of the past.

> "The beginning of intelligent conduct is the desire to violate super-imposed codes...The humanist"- (the psychoanalytic ethicist) - "humbly assumes that the behavior of 'wrong-doers" is on the whole neither better nor worse than the behavior of the generality

> of mankind. Thus, sincerely dedicated to truth, he must renounce the whole pernicious code of conventionalized morality as essentially theatrical and melodramatic and duplicitous, the arch-foe of man's true felicity."

I have quoted from this article at some length because it is a commentary upon psychoanalytic philosophy which needs, itself, no comment. It contains, also, the essence of stark anti-repressionism in such obvious doses that the effect cannot be escaped.

VIII.

In psycho-analytic ethics we have expressionism at its peak, an ethics based on a popular pseudo-scientific method of psychotherapeutics, which has on its side the claim of being a morality of disallusionment, and so carries a powerful motive. It has the further, incalculably valuable advantage of being founded on a method and hypothesis which is objectively impossible of verification. One who reads Freud critically, to say nothing of his numerous disciples, is puzzled, and often amused at the tortuous tangles of argument which lead from apparently simple acts, thru devious paths - all under the level of consciousness and hence incapable of inspection - to the most diabolically, deep-lying and infamously disgraceful desires of little children.

Results today indicate the truth of the diametrical opposite of Freud's dictum that "we can prove to society mathematically that its code of ethics has exacted more sacrifices than it is worth, and that its procedure rests neither on

veracity nor wisdom."(1) The actual vogue of expressionistic ethics in our own day demands attention to its results. Deliberate renunciation of moral effort is expected to follow the dismissal of social experience and teaching and motivation. Would it be so, if we insisted on including in that list of social attributes the popular and well-nigh universal predilection in favor of bodily pleasure as the essence of human felicity? Would it be so if we included as an inhibition to be cast off, that against conscience? Might we suggest that the malady which afflicts Mr. Schmalhausen and his fellow-liberators is the anti-conscience complex? In other words, the suggestion, is in order at least, that the principle might work both ways, and that a popular recrudescence of repressionism might be precipitated if we made conscience the libido, placing brute impulse as censor; and with the intellectual honesty which psychoanalysts boast, (but which their philosophy forbids practicing), dare to call good, good; evil, evil; high striving, noble.

Let us recognize the jellyfish as a jellyfish, and not allow ourselves to be fooled when he cleverly argues that vertebrates are also-unconsciously-spineless, and that the best procedure is therefore to ignore this illusory backbone and become as the jellyfish. If devolution and degeneration are factors in existence, we may listen to the siren call with impunity; if it is a reality, let us beware.

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(1) Quoted by Schmalhausen, Op. cit; p. 399

CHAPTER IV

EXPRESSION AND REPRESSION IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS.

I

A careful reader of the Christian Gospels finds many puzzling paradoxes, -many sayings which are indeed"hard". Defense for opposing viewpoints can be discovered with regard to a number of fundamental problems. Such cases are, e.g.; the question of the use of force, of the individual vs. society, of the relation between state and religion. The same strange contradictions appear in the teaching of Jesus with regard to moral motive. Moral liberals point with triumphant assurance to the picture of Jesus as a revolutionist, heretic and moral innovator, and they exult in calling attention to the pious self-righteousness with which high ecclesiastical leaders set about to oppose and finally to crucify him. The implication, of course, is that a liberal view of moral questions in the twentieth century has the sanction of true religion, and that so-called customary morality belongs to the scribes and Pharisees.

On the other hand, the conservative temper finds ample evidence in support of the attitude that Jesus was a thorough conservative, if not a reactionary, in moral matters. This "Son of God", who came, "not to destroy" the law, "but to fulfil" it, spoke, they say, not with the smiling tolerance of quick and easy forgiveness, but with the square-hitting dogmatism of conscious rightness. Those who follow this spirit in him are therefore the persons who learn the right as best they can,

then proceed to stand for it at any cost.

The liberal points out Jesus' attitude towards the erring woman; the conservative calls attention to the new commandment about adultery. The liberal shows us the abrogation of Sabbath observance by Jesus; the conservative presents the view of Jesus demanding new and greater holiness.

Just what was Jesus' teaching about morality ? Did he come as the apostle of a "new freedom", or was it an augmented rigorism that he preached ?

There is much to be said, from the Christian standpoint, concerning the claims of anti-regressionism and about the philosophy of motive in general. There is likewise much in the history of the Church to illustrate the conflict with which we have been dealing. Various opinions and practices have arisen from the attempt to interpret the fundamental Christian morality as taught and practiced by the Master. As a result we find in the Church such diverse extremes as asceticism on the one hand, and moral libertinism on the other.

II

Jesus himself, and the New Testament writers, are the best witnesses to the fact that the original gospel was not one of asceticism. The writer of the article, "Asceticism", in Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics assures us that,

> Neither as regards the individual nor as regards society do the ethical teachings and prescriptions of the New

> Testament go further than permit. It is intended not as a rigorous statute, but as a command of love, when the Lord commands his disciples to follow after him in the way of the cross and of humility; and the apostles adopted precisely the same free and mild attitude towards the problems of controlling the appetites and mortifying the flesh.
>
> Even Paul stands misinterpreted when he is represented as the authority for unnatural austerity:
>
> An injustice is done him when the attempt is made to read into his epistles anything like a commendation of a monastic withdrawal from the world, or of a fanatical maintenance of virginity. (1)

If this be true, -(a matter of which more will be said) - it was from without that the ascetic and monastic ideal came into the Church. Certain it is that in the early centuries of the Church's history various sects arose who stressed poverty, chastity and mortification. A notable fact is that there was associated with this early asceticism so much of the fantastic in doctrine which the Church condemend as heretical. The Gnostics and Manichaeans had distinct ascetic tendencies; the Ebionites and Montanists, both of whom were Judaistic and legalistic, also served as precursors to the asceticism of the fourth and following centuries. The writer already cited traces early Christian asceticism to "the influence of the late Greek and Judaeo-Hellenistic schools of philosophy". Undoubtedly the Egyptian cults should also be included, and certainly one must not leave out the philosophy and religion from Syria and Persia.

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(1) O. Zockler.

Origen, who was born about 185, was himself a pronounced ascetic, altho his teaching does not stress that aspect of the religious life. Jerome, however, (341-420) embodies more the spirit of an era. He promoted austerity and hermit life, and defended these ideals against Jovinianus, Vigilantius, and others. During that period numerous writers -Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine - made it "evident that the ascetical spirit had become dominant".(1) It became not only the official clerical mode of life for the Mediaeval Church, but also shaped and controlled the moral and religious ideals of all classes.

(1) Newman: Manual of Church History, p. 371 f.

III

Modern ideals represent such an extreme reaction from those which dominated medieval morality, that some advocacy of the older type might be justified, in the interest of balance. We can never look upon human nature and religion as former ages viewed them. Theology and morality have changed. The Christianity of the New Testament was what the reformers attempted to re-establish, but it has taken centuries to escape from the accidents of conduct which formed so much of the content of their religious morality. To this day, we find the survival of medieval asceticism in our inadequate conceptions of sex. For healthful frankness we too often substitute prudishness; for a joyous and normal attitude toward the marriage relation, we not infrequently substitute an enforced sense of concession to sin. Ascetic prohibitions also linger in certain Protestant circles with regard to tobacco, card-playing, dancing, and other amusements. It does not require a complete accord with the outspoken defenders of these forms of entertainment to detect the note of dogmatic asceticism in much of this objection to popular pleasures.

New Testament Christianity is once more the outstanding goal of our endeavor. And it is a goal, and not an achievement, largely because of the perennial necessity for adapting religious and religio-moral principles to the form and language of changing conceptions of human nature. Modern theology, freed so largely from the trammels of authority and dogma,

has probably been more nearly able to keep abreast of psychological advances than was formerly possible. In the present situation, the essential constituents of this parallelism may be stated as follows;

1. Both modern Christianity and modern psychology stress the united individual. Feeling, intellect and will; body, mind and spirit; -whatever the analysis, both science and religion agree that man cannot be treated on one side of his nature apart from the rest. From the standpoint of motive, this has great significance. It means, for example, that the controversy as to faith and works is practically meaningless, since that dispute hinges on the attempt to separate mind from will where mind and will (volition) are organically related. It means also that the unity which constitutes a person as we know him, includes body no less than mind and spirit, and that the soul of man lends meaning and worth to the body and its functions.

2. Both stress the essential dynamism of life and personality. Religion has long emphasized this aspect of human nature, but with the emphasis strongly on the side of its sinfulness. Salvation has meant on the other hand the possession of a man by the Spirit of God in such a manner that he becomes dynamic for righteousness. Modern theology, holding to this essential religious principle, now has the support of scientific psychology for the view that life is in itself active, outgoing, moving. Not powerful abstractions, like pleasure, pain, fear, love, are the moving factors in life, but concretions of inherent activity in emotions, sentiments,

instincts and habits. This is the first step of psychology; and the absolute necessity of accounting ultimately for phenomena of the spiritual life cannot but force scientists to the second step -that of recognizing some transcendant source of these otherwise inexplicible occurances. This is supplemented by a new principle of outwardness, as wel..

3. The remarkable agreement as to the objective factor in life and action is once more on the basis of a long-established principle of religious experience; namely, on the necessity for outer stimulus, other-centeredness, in normal action. The righteousness which religion has looked upon as normal is to be found only in the surrender of self; and in devotion to a person or cause. In this adoption of an object, a person finds himself. Psychology in the same way has come, -in that form of it which is often considered the foe of religion, Behaviorism,- to the expression of vital activities in terms which include objects or stimuli as essential functions. This is the aspect of behavior which the older and more "orthodox" introspectionism really needed to discover in order to be "saved". Religious Educational advance has in fact resulted more from behaviorism than from introspectioism, and this is simply because the former has brot to the front a long-recognized truth in religion itself, the necessity of an object as cause.

4. The fourth significant parallel is in the regognition of the need for resistance to harmful elements. Biological evolution taught men the value of survival factors, and even

biologists were not slow to recognize that moral factors began, early in the process, to shape the course and fate of species.(1) Brute strength, intellect, and moral qualities have emerged in turn as the determinants, first of adaptation to environment and then of transcendance and victory over it. Religion has ever seen the futility of attempting to drive a nail of soft lead into the hard plank that stands for our individual and social situations; as a claimant for the task of solving all human difficulties, religion has demanded of its clients the moral resistance of which we have already spoken. If, as according to Mr. Dawson, "degeneration has returned" for science, it will find modern theology ready to "kill the fatted calf" and give it"a royal welcome home." Psychology specialized over-long on the intellect; it seems at present to be wandering too far in the direction of mere action; the next step is the re-enthronement of the will, as a moral agent, allied naturally with the human quality which is best popularly designated as "backbone".

(1) See,e.g., Kropotkin: Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution.

IV

Jesus unites and transcends all these partial, abstract points of view. Not being either a psychologist or a theologian, but a personalist, he was interested less in theories than he was in his friends, his work and his Father's business. He furnishes us at once a surpassing example of simple, normal, natural, intuitional religion and at the same time gives us a revelation which wrings from us perforce our confession of his Divinity.

(1.) We can safely say that Jesus was not an ascetic. The total impression is directly contrary. Contrasted with John, he presented a picture of joyous living so bright that it called forth the censure of the Scribes and Pharisees.(1) His presence among men he likened to a bridal festival.(2) He partakes in the little, every-day joys of the common people.(3)

Let us see what Jesus has to say and show concerning the traditional ascetic practices and deprivations.

a. Fasting. The American revision and later translations omit the reference to fasting in Mark 9:29. In explaining the disciples' failure to cure the possessed boy, Jesus tells them that "This kind can come out by nothing save by prayer". In the parallel account in Matthew 17:21, the A.R. follows Mark's omission of "and fasting". The other positive reference of Jesus to fasting carries an implicit approval; "When

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(1) Matt. 11:19.
(2) Matt. 9:15.
(3) Lu. 10:3-10.

ye fast, be not as the hypocrites, of a sad countenance".(1) The same idea is conveyed, however, as that found in the incident of John's disciples and the Pharisees, where Jesus asks, "Can the sons of the bridechamber fast when the bridegroom is with them?"(2) Here the fast, both as a tradition and as an aid to devotion, is stripped of its outwardness, and is made strictly subservient to humanistic considerations.

(b) Celibacy. Jesus nowhere gives any intimation that sexual abstinence is more pleasing to the Heavenly Father than marriage. On the contrary, he made use more than once of illustrations from the marriage festival.(3) Certainly the "adultery" against which men are warned in the Sermon on the Mount is not to be taken as referring to what later came to be called "concupiscence."(4) Again, the statement concerning marriage and giving in marriage in Heaven, which came as an answer to the Sadducean casuistry,(5) refers, not to absence of marriage as an ideal condition, but quite obviously to the incomparable transcendence of the Kingdom over earthly relationships.

(c) Mortification. Jesus has no word of commendation for those who deliberately torture the body in order to win virtue for the spirit. True, he advised cutting off the hand or pull-

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(1) Matt. 6:16
(2) Mk. 2:19
(3) Matt. 22; Mk.2; Matt.25
(4) Matt. 5:28
(5) Matt. 22:3; Mk. 12:25; Lu. 20:35.

ing out the eye, rather than to lose the soul. This is the attitude which he typified and taught thruout. The body is the servant of the spirit, and much as a servant is cared for, fed, clothed, and protected, so one should show consideration for his physical self. Jesus goes even farther, and maintains that God himself takes an interest in these things, and will care for the very bodies of His faithful ones.(1) The intuition of the Master was sound here, as usual; he saw the true unity of the individual. This intuition of the inseparability of a living man's soul from his bodily existence was bound up with his religious conceptions, just as the opposite psychology attended the religious philosophy of asceticism. It is a fair inference that he would have condemned the fanatical attitude of later monastics towards the flesh, and would have disagreed thoroly with their interpretation of religion which went with it.(2)

(2.) On the other hand, Jesus was certainly not an "expressionist," as is shown by his attitude with regard to the essentials of that viewpoint.

(a) Hedonism. Far from proceeding on the principle that man is bound with chains to the throne of pleasure and pain, he insisted that the dynamic of love was all-powerful to control human conduct. This motif runs like a silver strain thru all the gospels. Hedonism was a familiar doctrine of Hellen-

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(1) Matt. 6:25 f.
(2) Cf. Scott: Ethical Teaching of Jesus; Ch. VII

istic philosophy, being found in Socrates, Plato,(1) Aristippus, and the Epicureans. But Jesus makes no use of it; his teaching shows no emphasis upon pleasure and pain as motives. The terms "joyful" and "blessed" are used in several cases, however. The beatitudes suggest an intensely personal motive; the persons whom he addresses are blessed in being poor, humble or pure in heart, but not in order to become blessed; neither is it implied that blessedness or "favor with God" is to be made the motive for compassion or mourning. The implication is indeed the very opposite here - that those are blessed who have so far forgotten self as to place a cause before their own pleasure, or who are so situated that pleasure occupies small part in their lives. In exhorting the persecuted to rejoice triumphantly, he explicitly regards present [illegible] as nothing, compared to the blessedness in store for those who are faithful to the end.(2)

The occasions for "joy" are times of self-for-getfulness. The ground receives the seed joyfully.(3) The man who finds the treasure rejoices in it.(4) The joy of the angels in Heaven is occasioned by the repentance of a sinner.(5) The return of the prodigal moves the father to great joy.(6)

For Jesus, it is not pleasure that serves as man's motive or as his ideal, but rather it is the Kingdom. In serving and loving, in forgetting self and devoting oneself to the

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(1) Philebus, 61; 12. But Cf. Republic, 583;586: Philebus.67
(2) Matt. 5:11-12
(3) Matt. 13:20
(4) Matt. 13:44
(5) Lu. 15:10
(6) Lu. 15:23

Kingdom a man finds joy and blessedness following naturally in their train. Those who do consciously seek blessedness- those who repeat long prayers, or give alms publicly, or observe strict fastings - receive fleeting, temporary rewards; joy in the higher sense is not in them.(1)

(b) Antinomianism. He did conduct a distinct polemic against the traditions and also against the Mosaic law itself. The morality of orthodox Judaism was so far a matter of mere conformity and custom that there was no life in it. Jesus' criticism of the law therefore lends great appearance of validity to the twentieth century criticism of conventional morality. But between the motives there is a wide gulf. Both criticisms seem to stand on the principle of the inwardness of morality. Both agree, also, in denouncing pretension and hypocricy. The great difference appears in two particulars: In the first place, Jesus disagrees with modern expressionism in his view of human nature. For him, human nature includes the spiritual nature, and it is the latter which predominates. The normal "life," which according to the Fourth Evangelist, Jesus came that we might "have life and have it more abundantly,"(2) is a life of self-forgetfulness and self-giving. Every lesser aspect of living is subordinated to the highest. Jesus regards it as at once most natural and most divine, that men should look upon the supreme glory of the Kingdom and then should be ready to sacrifice all for its benefit.(3)

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(1) Matt. 6
(2) Jn. 10:10
(3) Matt. 13:44-47

Is not the "pearl of great price" above all temporal esthetic values? Is not "the life more than food and the body more than raiment?"(1)

Life meant for Jesus the sort of life which is centered in spiritual values, with all parts of the individual transformed by the value of the Kingdom to which they are directed. This is quite different from the conception which rules the modern expressionist's search for fulness of life. Humanity being "a pig-sty, when liars, hypocrites, and the obscene in spirit congregate,"."disgust of life represents all that is substantial and real in the life of man."(2) "God cares nothing for the pure in heart,'....but offers a 'universe-eating career to the giant' whose life-force 'achieves avid, forceful, artistic expression' ".(3) The nearest approach, which this philosophy makes to holiness, is beauty, and beauty is in fact the only holiness it recognizes. Civilication and culture at best furnish only a beautiful mask for the soul, which has its natural internal kinship with the swine.

In the second place, Jesus' denunciation of scribal traditionalism rests on the substitution of a broader and more difficult morality, not on the desire for freer and less restrained instincts. When he says that "the Sabbath is made for man and not man for the Sabbath,"(4) he places a humanistic emphasis; a conformity which had been from respect for a tabu

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(1) Matt. 6:25
(2) George Moore; Leopardi. Quoted by Stuart Sherman; The Genius of America. p. 8-9.
(3) Ibid; p. 9. Quoting Theordore Dreiser
(4) Mk. 2:27

was made on inward responsibility. In teaching that conduct proceeds from within, outward, he was pleading for a new righteousness and purity, not for their neglect or destruction. The same teaching occurs in his exaltation of brotherly love, which is essentially the out-going of a spirit which resides in the heart. That this is no easing either of the task or of the conscience appears unmistakably in the Sermon on the Mount. Men are not only to refrain from murder and adultery, but are to do something much harder - keep their hearts clear of hate and of evil desire. It was comparatively easy for the young ruler to say that he had kept the commandments, but Jesus' shrewd test of the real spirit in him showed his fundamental lack. "He went away sorrowing."

The test of inwardness is in the fruits.(1) If the inner man is right, his deeds will display that rightness. Jesus does not throw off the test of conformity; he carries it to its source. In this he differs from contemporary critics of morality, who exalt non-conformity. To throw off the yoke, to discard the established way, is considered moral progress. And, while the standard to be followed by the "emancipated" seems at first glance to be an inner light, it really proves to be the most ordinary of external goals; it substitutes one kind of outer conformity for another, and the last state is worse than the first, because conformity to heterodoxy is always both easier and more self-conscious than its opposite.

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(1) Matt. 12: 33-35

The danger of a purely external standard is even greater here than in legalism, because the latter at least preserves the spirit (even tho it be ossified), while self-conscious, exultant non-conformity throws off the spirit along with its expression. The new conformity which it adopts is in our own time at least, based on the instinctive uniformity of humanity, rather than on uniformity of law or of inner ideal. Expressionism of the modern type endows man above all with a common brutishness; Jesus' self-expression is based on men's soul and divinity.

(3) In contrast to the"intellectual" type of moralist, Jesus makes life and conduct a matter of faith. He does not arrive by speculation at a principle of ethics, nor does he come at conclusions from philosophical analysis or intellectual gymnastics. He intuits first of all the Father, and from this intuition follow both the perception of the qualities of the Kingdom and the conviction of God's demands upon men. As Professor Scott says,

> "The assumptions on which he rests his ethics are purely religious. He does not argue, like the philosophical moralists, from the constitution of man's nature and the obligations laid on him as a social being, but stakes everything on postulates of faith." In his "bold revision of the accepted morality, he relied on nothing else than his knowledge of the nature of God." (1)

He does not exalt duty or happiness, individual pleasure or social good, conscience or intellect, altho he leaves room for all these. The mainspring of the moral life, however, lies

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(1) Ethical Teaching of Jesus; p. 38,39

in the will, not in the intellect. A transformed and surrendered will is the demand of God. "Seeking the Kingdom of Heaven" is a demand upon the will; and intelligence can only serve as an aid.

(4). He did not, on the other hand, disparage reason or intelligence; nor did he advocate the surrender of a man's mind to the uses of his lower nature. Anti-intellectualist ethics often means just this appropriation of the intellect by the instincts. Psychoanalysts, for instance, look upon reason as the apologist for past action. It justifies or invents excuses for evils; it plans for future escapades and imminent elusions of censorship.

Jesus was an anti-intellectualist in that he scorned the legalistic cavilings and casuistries of the priests. But he did not hesitate to use against them the shrewdest reasoning from his own premises. When confronted by the problems of political conformity or religious policy, he argued with amazing pointedness and conviction. But in all his teaching and conversation we find a continual touch with religious reality itself which fuses intuition and logic into an overpowering super-logic. Here is the use of reason in the service of the higher life, interpreting spiritual perceptions and bringing them into vital touch with the commonest phases of human existence.

V

Jesus taught and exemplified a transcendant type of self-expression. Both his teaching and his life -(the two cannot be separated)- show qualities of individuality which are unique and unsurpassed. Morality, according to his conception, is

supremely personal; it begins within a man, and proceeds outward with its effects. It is moreover joyous, happy, healthful, normal. It is objectively centered, and self-forgetful. It is unrestrained in mercy and love and kindness.

What are the characteristics of Jesus' self-expression, and in what way is it different from that of other individualists?

(1) In the first place, Jesus assumes that the natural loyalty of men is centered in a cause. One never gains from reading the Gospels the impression that the individual is to be self-centered. On the contrary, one of the most striking and profound utterances of the Master is that in which he tells his disciples to "Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness,"(1) with the promise that all other blessings are consequent on this. They are urged to stake their efforts on spiritual treasures, because "where your treasure is, there will your heart be also".(2) They are not to try to "serve God and mammon".(3) The inference is justified that a man is worthy or unworthy in the sight of God according as he alligns himself with a good or an evil cause, and that the degree of good or evil determines the worthiness of the man. Another, and a more important, reason for the need of firm loyalties is expressed in the parable of the empty house, (Luke 11:24f), which teaches that "Only by a stronger passion can evil passions be expelled, and that a soul unoccupied by a positive devotion

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(1) Matt.6:33.
(2) Matt.6:20,21.
(3) Matt.6:24

is sure to be occupied by spiritual demons."(1)

2. Jesus insists that in proportion as one adopts as his cause the welfare of his own temporal being, he fails in adequate self-expression. "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it."(2) This amazing paradox does not sound strange in the general setting of the Gospels; for thru all we discover the idea and the conviction that the soul's salvation lies in the pouring out of its life. In every other realm of life, increase comes by getting; in the realm of the spirit, the greater the sacrifice- the more goes out - the larger the gain. The life of Jesus illustrates this truth much more vividly than anything he said. What made a deeper impression on his followers than even his teaching was his service for the sick and unfortunate. He spared no effort or energy in his work of compassion. Chapter after chapter in the Gospels is devoted to the stories of miracles performed for others by the pouring out of his own "virtue." When at last it became necessary for him to suffer physical martyrdom, he bore the affair with consummate courage and with such victorious spiritual results that he became the hope of the world. The true self-expression, according to Jesus, is <u>giving</u>, <u>self-forgetfulness</u>, <u>loyalty</u>.

3. Jesus taught that the cause to which men are to submit themselves, "even unto death," is a personal and universally knowable cause - the Father in Heaven and his kingdom. It is

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(1) Fosdick: <u>Manhood of the Master</u>; "The Master's Self-restraint."
(2) Matt. 10:39

here that the claim of a divine revelation from Jesus finds its chief support, for it is in this conception that personal religion "comes of age." It furnishes both a form and a content for self-expression. But more than teaching about God, he embodied the qualities of God within himself and then called forth loyalty to himself. This is why it is impossible to separate the "religion of Jesus" from the "religion about Jesus." This is also the distinct and supreme advantage of founded religions that they draw human wills to God by the universally applicable means of personality working upon personality. Christianity with its cause, claims universality by virtue of the experience which loyalty to it calls forth. Those who have found the Father by having devoted themselves to His cause find a natural concurrence of feeling and will with the Jesus of the Gospels.

VI

The teaching of Jesus includes also, and not less strikingly, a valid principle of repression. "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."(1) This sounds too like the rigoristic idealism of our Puritan forefathers to be acceptable to many persons today. But it is a statement in which our modern scientific thot is prone to accede, when it is informed and intelligent. For we find in many circles a growing skepticism as to the poss-

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(1) Matt. 7:13

ibility of a democracy of virtue. The "masses" often seem to us to be incapable of "goodness," and we find ourselves hard pressed to keep upright in the midst of many confusing currents and eddies of moral influence. Let us inquire what are some of the things which, according to Jesus teaching, we are to forego.

One of the hardest tasks which many persons, particularly the "conventionally good," - have to face is that of abstaining from self-righteousness. This is no less a call for repression than any other, and it is the sin which Jesus denounced outstandingly. "Judge not, that ye be not judged... and why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye?"(1) Again, "not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven."(2) Very few of men's sins are singled out for such scathing rebuke as this one. The man praying on the street corner, or the almsgiver trumpeting his virtue before the temple worshippers are more hopeless than the publicans and sinners, who at least are open to repentance. This is an "embarrassment of virtue," of much the same sort that marks immoderation anywhere. Smug in their own conceit, these people are more difficult to bring to repentance than the openly sinful, and therefore are less able to enter into the Kingdom.(3)

A second danger, which belongs in the same class with self-righteousness, and in which Jesus constantly exhorts his hearers to constraint, is that of wealth. "It is easier for a camel to go thru a needle's eye, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God."(4) Mark permits a somewhat better insight here

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(1) Matt. 7: 1,3
(2) Matt. 7: 21
(3) Matt. 21: 28-32.
(4) Mk. 10:52.

than do the other Gospels, for his preceding verse quotes Jesus as saying, 'Children, how hard it is for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God!' Abundance, in that day even more than now, was considered a sign of Divine favor, and wealthy persons felt that they could look with religious as well as economic condescension upon those less fortunate. This trust in money is therefore to be sacrificed, even tho it might also entail getting rid of wealth itself.

This self-restraint in the holding of property does not carry the same religious obligation today that it did under pragmatic religion,(1) but there is still much hard common-sense in the advice of Jesus on this point. Men still need to learn to curb their self-satisfaction, both for their own sakes and for the sake of their associations; and it is as much of a task for the will -for repression- as is restraint from stealing or rapine.

Jesus has something to say about curbing the lower nature, but he has more to say about purity of heart. There is no hint of an easier morality. "Think not" he says, "that I came to destroy the law or the prophets; I came not to destroy, but to fulfil....One jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished".(2) The Sermon on the Mount is altogether full of this spirit of restraint. "Blessed are the pure in heart".(3) Anger and scorn are punishable just as

(1) Referring to the type of religion which views temporal welfare as the indication of God's favor or disfavor.
(2) Matt. 5:17.
(3) Matt. 5:8.

are murder, and no man is to consider himself religiously right as long as he cherishes hate or spite.(1) Toward unrestraint of instincts Jesus advocates the most serious measures. Both Matthew and Mark give us the passage in which Jesus says, "If thy right eye causeth thee to stumble, pluck it out....and if thy right hand causeth thee to stumble, cut it off,.....for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not thy whole body go into gehenna".(2) In this hyperbolic statement there is a striking insight into the attitude of the master regarding fleshly lusts. While it is obviously a figure of exaggeration, it nevertheless places the emphasis upon self-control, self-deprivation, repression, at their very root; and it prevents us surely from using the authority of Jesus to support an easy-going determinism or a "laissez-faire" attitude toward the appetites of the body.

Jesus continues by urging self-restraint in speech. "Let your speech be Yea,yea; Nay,nay".(3) Extravagance in language indicates a lack of inward poise and control; hence it is to be avoided. Anger, also, is to be kept in check, and the instinct which prompts "eye-for-eye" and "tooth-for-tooth" justice is utterly repudiated.(4) Impulse says, 'Smite him who smites you'; Jesus says, 'Turn to him the other cheek'. Impulse says, 'Love your neighbor and hate your enemy'; Jesus says, 'Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you'.

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(1) Matt. 5:21-24 .
(2) Matt. 5:29,30; Mk. 9:47,45; also Matt. 18:9,8.
(3) Matt. 5:37.
(4) Matt. 5:38-44.

This is supreme self-repression. Altogether, it appears that the gate is indeed strait and the way narrow, to the perfection which is like that of the Father. But it is saved from hopelessness by the complementary teaching of self-expression thru devotion to the Father. It is the possession of man by this spirit of devotion and love which makes such restraint possible; and conversely, the restraint is necessary to the coming of the Kingdom.

VII

We have seen in our study of the Gospel of Jesus how Christianity offers a substitute for various secular moralities in providing a vital motive for moral action. It possesses a principle of expression which brings self into the realm of spirit. It has a principle of repression which aims at promoting the supremacy of the highest elements in humankind. It is psychologically and philosophically sound. It proceeds on faith, but not on a faith which is opposed to the intellect. It is an ethics of conviction, but not of dogma; of simple and native joy, but not of thotless and inconsiderate pleasure. It offers an ideal, but not without offering also the motive of sufficient strength to attain that ideal.

Pleasure- ethics is superceded and transcended. Pleasure takes its proper place as a result, and not as either a purpose or a cause. It is not even retained as a criterion, but is so transformed as to become virtually another thing. For pleasure is made consequent upon giving instead of upon getting, upon loyalty rather than selfishness, upon spiritual rightness, not

physical or mental satisfaction.

Instinct - ethics is provided with a transforming complement. For while the needs and interests of the whole man are recognized and regarded as normal, this recognition is made in the light of a supremely important religious truth. The soul is the person, not his body; the value of the whole man is gained from the highest part of him, not from the lower. This highest pinnacle of creation is no less than the indwelling of God himself in the person of the human individual, and all conduct is to be controlled and gauged by this supreme fact.

Reason - ethics is given both material for judgments and effective energy for carrying them out in action. Without these, intelligence is simply amoral. Religious intuition furnishes living issues, immediate moral valuations-, which alone can give meaning to moral reasoning.

Agnostic or naturalistic ethics is offered a dynamic which substitutes personal for natural terms, and personalism for naturalism as a philosophy of life. In one sense, the Christian ethic offers the true naturalism, for the natural, in the sense of normal, real, is found in God. But there is another sense- that of original, immature. Nature here presents the universal phenomenon of growth, and therefore requires an energy for overcoming in the eternal struggle upward. For man in his fellowships, it means morality; morality in its essence means will manifested in control; control is impossible without power, and power of this sort is available both for defense and for attack in personality.

The difficult technique and the "strength of gentleness"

required for making these intensely vital personal adjustments is supremely manifested in Jesus. His personality fills us with a constantly increasing sense of wonder and admiration. We find in his teaching an inexhaustible depth of insight, which grows in us as we perceive him more fully. Expanding experience opens up to the Christian a store of power - an inner force which is derived from devotion, love and sacrifice. We lose, and at the same time, find, ourselves in the cause of the eternal Christ.

"Who that for one moment has the least descried him,
Dimly and faintly, hidden and afar,
Doth not despise all excellence beside him,
Pleasures and powers that are not and that are?"

- END -

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